Two important gaps exist in the IS alignment research. Firstly, there is scant research on the potential of organizational culture, and specifically subcultures to influence the strategic alignment of IS and organizations. Secondly, there is a dearth of literature that considers the relationship between alignment and implementation success. In this paper, we address both of these gaps by considering the influence of organizational subcultures on the alignment of a specific IS -a knowledge management system (KMS) -with organizational strategy. Our analysis demonstrates the important roles played by three different subcultures -enhancing, countercultural and chameleon -in the alignment of the KMS. The analysis also underscores the complementary nature of the alignment and implementation literatures and suggests that they should be used in concert to explain the success of an IS. Drawing on our analysis, we build a subculture model, which depicts the intersection of alignment and implementation. From a managerial perspective, the subculture model highlights three different approaches to managing alignment and implementation. From a theoretical perspective, our paper highlights the need for IS alignment models to be modified so that sub-unit level analyses are incorporated. It also illustrates that organizations confront challenges of alignment and implementation simultaneously rather than sequentially.
Introduction
Strategic alignment has long been an issue of importance both in Information Systems (IS) research and to IS practitioners. A recent SIM study of CIOs found that strategic alignment was considered the most important issue facing CIOs (Luftman et al., 2006) . Alignment remains an important issue for CIOs in part because failure to align IS with business strategy is believed to result in the failure of many IS initiatives. Particularly in the case of organization-wide (or enterprise-wide) IS initiatives, alignment with the strategic objectives of the organization is an important challenge for modern organizations (Chan et al., 1997b; Hirschheim and Sabherwal, 2001; Sabherwal and Chan, 2001) . The IS-alignment literature has focused on aligning major IS initiatives with organizational strategy (Chan, 2002) , with business structures (Ein-Dor and Segev, 1982) and with IS structures (Brown and Magill, 1994) . Yet, in spite of the long tradition of research into IS-alignment as well as the endeavours of CIOs to better bridge the gap with senior managers, alignment remains a perennial problem for many organizations.
Whereas existing alignment research proposes a number of formal structural mechanisms an organization needs to incorporate at the top-management level to reduce cases of misalignment (e.g., Soh and Sia, 2005) , research also highlights the influential and long-lasting role played by informal structural elements embedded in the social life of an organization in aligning organizational IS with strategic objectives (e.g., Chan, 2002) . Against this background, it seems feasible that a strong organizational culture, and perhaps more importantly, the prevailing dominant subcultures within an organization, could also influence the alignment process. While the roles played by the business strategies, business structures and the IS structures of organizations in ensuring successful IS -business alignment have been emphasized in the literature (e.g., few studies have empirically examined the influence of subcultures (i.e. the influence of the practices, interpretations and beliefs of various subgroups). Further, although IS literature has considered the IS alignment and IS implementation processes independently, few studies have examined the relationship between alignment and implementation. We believe that it is important to understand the alignment process of a specific IS implementation and how this alignment changes as the system itself is extended. Our study therefore examines the influence of organizational subcultures on the alignment of a particular IS in an organization -a knowledge management system (KMS)with a goal towards understanding how and why subcultures influence the alignment of the KMS with the organizational strategy at the corporate and business-unit levels. Our case analyzes a KMS that is initially well aligned with the organization's strategy but is difficult to implement across organizational sub-units. Such a study bears relevance to not only KMS, but to other IS implementations that on the surface are well aligned with the organization's strategy and yet under the surface, at the sub-unit level, meet with resistance Scarbrough, 1999, Pan and Leidner, 2003) .
Theoretical Foundation
Alignment (or fit or linkage) between various organizational components is seen as a key to improved organizational performance (Beer et al., 2005; Miller, 1992; Reich and Benbasat, 1996) and refers to the "degree to which the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structure of one component are consistent with the needs, demands, goals, objectives, and/or structure of another component" (Nadler and Tushman, 1980, p.43) . As IS increasingly assumes strategic roles in organizations, IS alignment or strategic IS alignment is seen as the alignment of an organization's IS strategy with the business objectives of the organization Reich and Benbasat, 1996) .
The early work on alignment emphasized the identification of those factors that are vital for reaching and sustaining high alignment (e.g., Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Chan, 2002) . The most prominent factors that are shown to facilitate alignment include shared domain knowledge between IS and business executives (Rockart et al., 1996; Reich and Benbasat, 2000) and support of senior executives for IS strategies (Luftman and Brier, 1999) . A popular conceptualization of strategic IS alignment is the strategic alignment model (SAM) Venkatraman et al., 1993) which is defined in terms of four domains of strategic choice available to an organization, namely the business strategy, the IS strategy, infrastructure, and processes. Most empirical studies have, either directly or indirectly, drawn on the four domains of the SAM to operationalize and explain organizations' IS alignment (e.g., Avison et al., 2004; Cragg et al., 2002; . Research has also shown that improved organizational performance resulting from IS alignment is reflected in greater returns on IS investment, greater firm profitability and achievement of competitive advantage (Luftman and Brier, 1999; Kearns and Lederer, 2004; Peppard and Ward, 2004) .
More recently, the alignment research has focused less on identifying factors that comprise and/or influence an outcome of alignment, but has instead conceptualized alignment as a dynamic process. This dynamic perspective considers alignment as a moving target and views organizations as going through continuous transitory periods of high alignment and low alignment (Brown and Magill, 1994; . For instance, Cegielski et al. (2005) observed that e-commerce based IS strategies which during the dot com boom of the late 1990s appeared well aligned with business, eventually gave only meager returns to a number of organizations since IS alignment in these cases remained only a transitory phase. Research also highlights the influence of factors such as uncertain industry environments (Choe, 2003; Kearns and Lederer, 2004; Miller, 1992) , mergers and acquisitions (Wijnhoven et al., 2006) and international expansions (Rondinelli et al., 2001) that potentially makes alignment a moving target, rather than just a desired outcome.
Similar in concept to the dynamic perspective of alignment, although not employing the term "alignment" per se, research examining IS implementation success across work groups and over time suggests that different groups perceive and respond to the same IS quite differently. IS implementation research often attributes such differences to the embedded informal structures (or informal relationships or informal arrangements) in an organization. These informal structures influence the perceptions of and responses to IS implementation efforts and have important organizational consequences. For example, Schultze and Orlikowski (2004) showed how the quality of customer facing personnel's embedded relationships with their customers was seriously affected by the implementation of a self-serve technology. Likewise, Tyre and Orlikowski (1994) found that experience with a new technology often 'routinizes' it in the organization and subsequently, limits and poses barriers to desired future adaptations. Other implementation studies have also highlighted the centrality of informal arrangements by examining relationships, contexts, power structures and the micro-level changes enacted by actors (e.g., Barley, 1986; Orlikowski, 1996; Robey and Boudreau, 1999) . One conclusion from these studies is that it is important to look into the social context, including the intentions and actions of key players, when planning an IS implementation (Orlikowski, 1993) .
In highlighting the informal organizational structures, recent IS implementation research has also considered a multi-level perspective. Rivard (2005, 2007) in a multi-level longitudinal analysis of IS implementation in hospitals demonstrated how the consequences of implementation are influenced by both individuals' perceptions of the IS as well as by contextual factors at the individual, group and organizational levels. They concluded that a model at one level is unable to fully predict the outcome of an IS implementation. Only in examining the same phenomenon through models at different levels can one get a more complete picture of the implementation effort and outcomes (Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) .
Like the implementation research, recent IS alignment research has also begun to emphasize the role played by informal structure (Chan, 2002) . Structural alignment concerns the degree of fit between an organization's structure and IS decision making rights and structure (Chan, 2002) . The research on IS -business structure alignment typically highlights the importance of the need for IS strategies of organizations to be aligned with the organizational business structure (e.g., Jordan and Tricker, 1995) . Informal structure -the formal and informal teamwork, working relationship, and culture of an organization -has also been found to be important to achieving alignment (Chan, 2002) . This informal structure is independent of the formal organization structure and is projected to be an enduring aspect of alignment as opposed to the more transient formal structural alignment.
As noted above, the concept of informal structures does include cultural elements of an organization. However, we believe that by considering organizational culture and organizational subcultures as firmly grounded concepts distinct from the concept of informal structures, more nuanced explanations of their links to the IS alignment process can be obtained. At its deepest level, culture consists of core values and beliefs that are embedded tacit preferences about what the organization should strive to attain and how it should do it (DeLong and Fahey, 2000) . These tacit values and beliefs determine the more observable organizational norms and practices that consist of rules, expectations, rituals and routines, stories and myths, symbols, power structures, organizational structures, and control systems (Bloor and Dawson, 1994; Johnson, 1992) . Unique values, beliefs and practices also often exist at various group/sub-unit levels, which can be best described as subcultures. Therefore, considering the manifestations of culture, specifically subcultures, adds an important sub-unit level perspective to the alignment literature that has thus far assumed that with appropriate organization-level coordination, such as effective communication between the CIO and CEO and the linking of business and IS missions and plans, and the sponsoring of IS projects by high-level managers, the success of IS initiatives will follow.
In summary, it appears to us that an under-studied component in alignment research is that of organizational subcultures and the influence they exert on the alignment process.
Implementation research too makes clear that cultural factors at sub-unit levels influence implementation outcomes. Moreover, most IS alignment studies implicitly assume homogeneity of the organization and therefore, anchor their analysis at the organizational level. Such analyses ignore the influence of sub-unit factors, when these factors might influence the misalignment of a system in parts of the organization. Also, as noted earlier, very few IS studies explicitly consider the relationship between alignment and implementation. Taking these factors into consideration, we propose a dual-level analysis that considers the influence of organizational subcultures on the alignment of a given IS -that of a KMS -with both the organizational business strategy at the corporate level as well as with the strategies in specific business units.
Research Methods
Using a case study method, we adopted the approach of "soft positivism" 1 or "scientific realism" (Kirsch, 2004; Madill et al., 2000) . This approach allowed us to conduct the data analysis with certain expectations based upon prior theory while also allowing some unexpected 1 Our usage of the term "soft positivism" differs from its usage in the legal fraternity where it is used to indicate a particular intellectual position about the relationship between laws and morality (Mitrophanous, 1997) findings and explanations to emerge from the data, as is more typical of interpretivist approaches. We explain our case study approach below.
Underlying assumptions
We approached our fieldwork at ITS, an India-based global information technology (IT) services and consulting company, with a premise that subcultures exist, that subcultures influence alignment and implementation, and that subcultures are identifiable using an existing theoretical lens. This position captures the positivism inherent in our study. Accordingly, our study draws upon Martin and Siehl's (1983) characterization of organizational subcultures as consisting of three forms: an "enhancing" subculture where the values of the dominant organizational culture predominate, an "orthogonal" subculture where the values of the dominant culture co-exist with values and assumptions unique to the subculture and a "countercultural" subculture whose behaviors and artifacts reveal values and assumptions that directly pose a challenge to the dominant organizational culture. Drawing on this categorization, we objectively studied the KMS alignment process through the subculture lens, anticipating different alignment phenomenon based upon different subcultures.
At the same time, because organizational research has exposed the dangers inherent in taking a purely functionalist perspective of cultural attributes of groups (Alvesson, 1987; Van Maanen and Barley, 1984; Young, 1989) , we also recognized that subcultures may have their own unique characteristics unrelated to any theoretical classification offered in the organizational literature.
We were thus open to the softer or interpretivist position that the subcultures existing at ITS as experienced by ITS employees may not necessarily follow any of Martin and Siehl's categories. We therefore sought to unveil the emerging categories through the perspective of our informants using a soft or a subjective mode of analysis.
Our analysis of the influence of subculture on alignment and implementation also combined positivist and interpretivist approaches to analysis. We first took existing research on alignment and implementation factors and analyzed the factors present or lacking for each subunit. This aspect of the analysis implied a positivist approach of deciding in advance expected factors and assessing based upon informant comments whether the factors were, or were not, experienced. Following this, we employed a more interpretivist approach in drawing conclusions about the relationship of alignment and implementation. It was this aspect of the analysis that enabled us to offer a new perspective of 'subcultural alignment', detailed in the theoretical implications section. The positivist stance gave our study the necessary initial focus, while the softer stance gave us the freedom to develop themes and theoretical categories without having to force the data into existing themes.
Company background ITS, a pseudonym, is the company that we studied. ITS is an India-based global IT services and consulting company, which employs more than 50,000 people across 10 countries.
It has a client base of more than 400 global companies including a number of Fortune 500 companies. ITS offers technology solutions in areas that include software development, application management, system integration, enterprise solutions, embedded systems, engineering services and e-commerce.
Structurally, ITS is organized into a number of independent business units called vertical units (VU) and horizontal units (HU), which respectively correspond to two key dimensions of business. The first dimension is the 'vertical dimension', which recognizes that the nature of knowledge required to produce quality software for one industry, such as the automobile industry, is quite different from the kind of knowledge required to write software for another industry, such as the financial services industry. The second dimension is the 'horizontal dimension', which ensures services in specific technology competencies. In addition to these independent VU and HU, ITS has also established around 30 smaller units known as offshore development centers (OSDCs), with each OSDC unit having long term relationships with a specific client organization. Established in conjunction with the client organization, they function almost as offshore extensions of the client organization, are independent profit centers, and are relatively isolated from other ITS business units.
Case access and Data collection
ITS had only recently implemented a KMS when we proposed our research project to the company's top-management team and they extended their full support to our fieldwork plans.
Given that we had no personal stake in the implementation, they showed a keen interest in getting our perspective of the organizational consequences of their KMS. The KMS -dubbed "KMaster" --was developed in-house at ITS by a dedicated KM team. In the initial few months, the organization's KMS was reserved only for the business development and pre-sales/sales personnel, and a few project managers, all of whom worked in the corporate office. We shall refer to this KMS user group as the corporate unit. The KMS was subsequently extended and offered to the technical community in the organization, which included the VU, HU and the OSDC units. Reflecting this in our fieldwork, in addition to the corporate unit we have considered the implementation of the KMS in 3 other units: a vertical unit called ITS-VU, a horizontal unit called ITS-HU and an OSDC unit called ITS-OS.
The first author conducted fieldwork in these ITS units for five months. Multiple qualitative data sources were used including documents, emails, the Internet, field notes and KM artifacts. We were given access to internal company documents, including minutes of the various meetings conducted by the KM implementation team. The fieldwork also involved observation of people in various work and non-work related activities, during which time many informal conversations ensued. These informal conversations covered many different topics including discussions about the KM artifacts or about documents presented at a previous company seminar.
For instance, looking at artifacts such as graphs of KMS usage statistics in the various business units, we often got into informal discussions with employees about what the graphs indicated.
During fieldwork, the first author was also present at some of ITS's internal meetings and
presentations.
An important source of data was forty-two in-depth interviews with members of project teams, mainly from ITS-VU, ITS-HU and ITS-OS. The interviewees included software engineers, senior software engineers, project managers, technical analysts, KM implementation team members, business unit heads, vice-presidents (V-P) and directors of the company. All the interviews were recorded and transcribed. The interview questions largely concerned the role of the interviewee, his/her understanding of and response to the KMS. The first round of interviews comprised of direct face-to-face interactions, while the follow-up interviews were either face-toface or telephonic or e-mail based. The interviews are summarized in Table 1 . Further, following Yin (2003) we record in Table 2 the steps taken to ensure reliability and validity during the study. 
Representative list of interview questions
Transcripts of e-mail and telephonic discussions with informants
In the case description, we have cited extensively from the contents of the case study data base. 'The circumstances of each data collection activity' was carefully recorded and the data collection closely followed the case study protocol (Kirsch, 2004) . Thus, the chain of evidence presented helps link the empirical material with the findings Possible 'informant types' and strategies to handle them. Ex: How to interview a very patronizing informant?
Field notes: Impressions of informal conversations with informants during fieldwork
Review of case drafts
List of other potential themes to be explored in the interview
Company documents relating to the KMS implementation and statistics of KMS usage in different units
The initial draft of the case was reviewed by three informants who observed that the draft offered useful insights. They also recommended some changes. The head of the KM team, a senior vicepresident and a project manager reviewed the drafts.
Table 2. Steps to ensure construct reliability and validity (Yin, 2003)

Data analysis
At the end of five months of fieldwork, we examined the data closely to look for possible subcultural affiliations. In order to assess sub-unit subculture, we needed to understand the informants' feelings about the organization as a whole. To this end, we read through the interview transcripts and the recorded on-field observations and came up with themes in the informants' comments and feelings about ITS. Four themes emerged: the feelings about the wisdom of top-management decisions, feelings regarding the importance of cooperation across the business units, feelings about IT-based, top-management sponsored quality initiatives, and feelings about communication and information openness (see Appendices A and B). When coding for these themes, we grouped similar ideas together.
Next, in order to get a closer perspective of ITS-VU we triangulated data from three main sources: interviews and observations at ITS-VU, interviews with informants in the rest of the company and the minutes of the KM implementation team's meetings, which discussed in considerable detail the responses to the KMS implementation in the various business units. The data was open coded to better understand ITS-VU's characteristics. Common statements were used to form four provisional themes, which best described ITS-VU members' perceptions, attitudes and relationship with the larger organization (see Appendix C). We then consolidated the provisional themes to create a more abstract and theoretical theme, which we called a 'supporting unit'. In other words, the common thread running through the four themes was the members' support of the actions and espoused values of the top-management team, following which we created the 'supporting unit' theme. By travelling back and forth between the abstract theme and the categories described by Martin and Siehl (1983) , we were able to see that the 'supporting unit' fit with the description of an enhancing subculture.
Similarly, we considered all the primary and secondary data corresponding to ITS-OS (see Appendix D). The ITS-OS data revealed that members' thinking directly contrasted with the top-management mandated beliefs and therefore posed a considerable challenge to the aims of the KMS implementation. Following this, we created the 'opposing unit' theme, which demonstrated the characteristics of a counterculture highlighted by Martin and Siehl (1983) .
One category from the subcultural classification of Martin and Siehl (1983) -the orthogonal subculture -did not appear to be consistent with the data (see Appendix E). Although we were tempted to theorize the ITS-HU data as an orthogonal subculture, in reality the themes underpinning the data did not show strong subcultural tendencies of its own but simply adapted to sub-unit environments. This led to the inductive emergence of a new subcultural categorythe chameleon culture 2 .
Finally, we looked for ways in which the subcultural categories related to each other and also engaged in a subjective analysis of their influence on the KMS implementation. In the interviews and analysis, we were sometimes confronted with contradictory evidence. For instance, one informant at ITS-OS suggested that responses to the KMS in ITS-OS were influenced by the nature of their agreements with the client organization and not by subcultural factors. Such contradictions were mostly resolved by asking the concerned informant to clarify and explain further and by cross-checking with other sources of evidence. A more detailed description of the various themes in the three business units is available in Appendices C, D and E.
At this stage in the analysis process, we had looked for indications of alignment and implementation success purely from a subcultural perspective. We then drew upon a literature review to create a theoretically grounded list (displayed in table 4 and table 5) 
Case Description
The decision to implement a KMS in early 2002 was taken by the CEO. The topmanagement team created a full-time 10 member team (or unit) called SU-KMI (strategic unit -KM initiative) consisting of software developers and marketing personnel from the IS and marketing departments respectively. The head of this central KM implementation team reported directly to the president of the organization. The central KM team's mandate was to try and make sure that the client-facing sales and business development personnel in the corporate unit had the requisite up-to-date information when meeting potential clients. Therefore the focus of the KMS was on building repositories that contained case studies of past projects, presentations to clients, organizational best practices etc. The KMS contained material such as proposals and project information classified and catalogued into business domains, technology domains and competencies. The KM team requested and obtained this information from the various project teams who were involved in executing projects and providing solutions to clients. The KM implementation team also created a help-desk comprising four of its members in order to assist individuals using the KMS. They took queries from the sales and business development members and got back with solutions while the requestors waited on-line. The help-desk service was further enhanced to an automated IVR (integrated voice recognition) system that took care of repetitive queries from the sales and business development community. The head of the KM implementation team gave an example of a typical urgent query from a sales executive: "I urgently need a list of all the mainframe migration projects we have done at ITS".
Since its implementation, the KMS has undergone substantial extension. The KMS, initially developed for the corporate unit, was subsequently offered to the technical community in the organization, which currently consists of more than 25,000 members and includes software developers, project leaders and project managers in the different VU, HU and OSDC units. This extension of the system involved both adding features and expanding the user base. New features included applications such as the ITS repository, K-Phone, K-Transmit etc (see Table 3 ). At present, the central KM team through KMaster offers a host of IT-based applications and innovations which encourage members of all business units to share the knowledge gained during the course of their projects. In the perception of the top-management team, middle-level managers and the KM team, the organizational KMS has two main goals. Firstly, it helps members solve everyday work-related issues more efficiently. According to a senior project manager at ITS: "As a company, when you grow very fast often you won't even know what is happening in some other part of the company. If you are a developer, you may have struggled over a problem for weeks together and you may come to know only later that some other guy in the company who had the same problem in his project has already come out with a good solution (and you did not even know about it!). So the need of a strong KM support is extremely essential in such cases."
Secondly, the top management feels that from a strategic viewpoint, breaking in to some of the highly decentralized business units (or silos) and incorporating their knowledge into the KMS is essential. Through the KMS, the organization hopes to build on the project experiences of the various business units so that it can strategize and offer a wider range of services to clients in the future.
KMS features
Description
ITS Repository
Contains knowledge resources classified according to category (e.g., best practices, domain, technology etc). Also contains project profiles, ITS patents and an online library.
K-Transmit
Members at all levels in the organization spend significant time reading and responding to emails.
The KM team latched on to this practice and modeled the 'K-Transmit' service around it. Through 'K-Transmit', queries posted by members are channeled to the mail boxes of the right audience, and their email replies are tracked and logged in the repository. Thus with 'K-Transmit, the knowledge otherwise floating around gets logged at one place.
K-Phone
K-Phone is an off-the-shelf SMS (Mobile messaging) technology to facilitate requesting of key documents by members while on the move. This document-request-and-delivery service is automated with inexpensive technology and small programming effort.
K-Skool
These are tacit knowledge sharing sessions organized across the organization. Topics chosen for these sessions are contemporary and interesting to a cross-section of members. These sessions serve two prime purposes, documenting tacit knowledge of the members while they share their experiences, and creating awareness about KM and its services.
Helpdesk Service
A dedicated team attends to the queries and requests of the members, thus trying to make this initiative more reachable and useful.
KM sharing sites
To accommodate the already existing internal KMSes of different business units on the organizational KMS, the KM implementation team hosts the internal websites (that manage knowledge at the business unit level) of the different business units on KMaster. These sites are called 'sharing sites' and some business units now have sharing sites on KMaster. "We are telling all members that so far we considered as invaluable those people who got the company a lot of good projects. We are saying that from now on we will also give importance to the performance of members who help create knowledge. So we will keep track of such people and help them go up faster."
In summary, while the initial focus of the KMS was the corporate unit, the subsequent extensions to the system also brought into focus the VU, HU and the OSDC units. To date, the KMS implementation has met with the most success in the VU, with mixed success in the HU, and with little success in the OSDC. We consider experiences from each of these sub-units. First, we present the case ITS-VU, a 1000 member strong unit that works on application development and maintenance projects for clients belonging to a specific industry segment. Most of the project teams and members at ITS-VU work in a 'one-off project' mode, completing one project and taking up the next one, which usually involves a different client in the same unit. Then we consider the KMS implementation at of ITS-HU, a 750 member strong unit that takes up projects involving a particular technology competency. Members belonging to ITS-HU typically are assigned to projects in various business units that require skills in this technology domain. On completing one project in a business unit, members move to some other project in a different business unit. Lastly, we present the case of ITS-OS, a 400 member strong OSDC unit whose client is a leading organization in the financial industry. Unlike the 'one-off project' mode of ITS-VU, ITS-OS has a long-term relationship with its client organization.
Analysis
Our analysis focuses on the experiences of the three business units (ITS-VU, ITS-HU and ITS-OS) with the KMS as separate cases. We first present a within-case analysis of the subcultural patterns and their and role in the respective unit's KMS experience. We then present a cross-case analysis, which examines the alignment and implementation factors present in each of the three business units, as well as in the corporate unit.
The case of ITS-VU Members of ITS-VU reported that they look up to top management for guidance and inspiration and that they strive to embody the values espoused by top management. They viewed themselves as embodying the "real" culture of ITS and maintained a strong identification with the corporate office. A software engineer noted:
"As the outsourcing phenomenon proliferated, the organization created a number of business units to meet the growing demand for quality IT services. For business reasons, many of these units have to remain isolated from the organizational mainstream. But here at ITS-VU, there are no such compulsions. Members strongly associate themselves with ITS and grab every opportunity to get noticed at the organizational level." Moreover, members of ITS-VU reported that new strategies initiated by the top management typically are met with enthusiastic endorsement even if some projects create an initial uncertainty. As a project manager explained it:
"Our mental frame of reference is always the larger organization. So though we may take some time to get used to new expectations arising out of a new strategic focus or a industry buzzword, we fall in line sooner rather than later." In this sense, ITS-VU can be characterized by what Martin and Siehl (1983) refer to as an "enhancing" subculture where the values of the broader organizational culture predominate. The enhancing subculture had maintained a strong identification with the corporate office and the members were positively inclined to accept strategic initiatives championed by the senior management. Consistent with this subcultural tendency, members at ITS-VU have responded enthusiastically to the roll-out of KMaster. Informants recalled that ever since the KMS was rolled out, they have been excited by the applications available on KMaster and accessed them frequently. A senior software engineer explained:
"Initially when the KMS was implemented, we were very curious about what KM was and how it was going to benefit us and the organization. Once 'K-Skool' sessions were launched under the aegis of organization-wide KM, we began to really see the benefits. 'K-Skool' sessions are primarily tacit knowledge sharing sessions, where we meet, brainstorm, and discuss a wide-range of cutting-edge technical issues." Many members from ITS-VU registered for these sessions and attended them. Informants found these sessions very useful and reported that they motivated them to contribute to the KMS. According to a system engineer who had attended a K-Skool session:
"After attending K-Skool, I am now a very keen contributor to KMaster. I upload a lot of software codes to KMaster that can be reused and so other developers find them very useful. I have got many 'thank you' e-mails from members in various units." Most informants at ITS-VU felt that with the implementation of the KMS, they could easily recognize the immense potential of sharing knowledge with members from other business units.
A project manager explained:
"My previous project was completed in 4 months flat and we just moved on to the next one. So we are very keen that the organization benefit from the knowledge created in each of our project. So over the years, we have tended to get actively involved with the organization's KM strategy. Moreover, I strongly feel the KMS is very beneficial to our unit as well"
Since its implementation, members of ITS-VU have contributed re-usable software codes, project best practices and case studies to the various KMaster repositories. They also often posted their technical project related queries to the many discussion forums setup on the organization-wide KMS and claimed to get quick replies from members other business units working in similar technology domains.
The case of ITS-HU As noted earlier, members at ITS-HU were assigned to different business units during different projects. The need to quickly adapt to a new unit seemed to have fostered a culture of adaptability and flexible team-focused individuals within the unit. ITS-HU can be said to have a "chameleon" culture. The notable feature of this 'chameleon culture' was its ability to adapt to the subculture of the unit it was assigned to. Indeed, informants at ITS-HU felt that one of their main characteristics was their ability to integrate into the cultures of different business units.
According to a senior software engineer:
"Since we are constantly shuttling between different business units, we try to fit well into different environments. As a result, we do not have any common practices or strong beliefs that can be called 'uniquely ITS-HU'. But many of the business units we work in have their own norms and practices and for the time we are there, we religiously follow all of them. " Another software engineer echoed:
"In a recent project, I worked in a business unit where people were always making sarcastic remarks about the organization's mission statements and quality processes. After a period of time, I found myself making similar remarks. In my current business unit, everybody is dead serious about quality processes and now I find myself totally in agreement with them."
The response of the chameleon culture at ITS-HU to the KMS was mixed and dependent upon whether or not the unit to which an individual was temporarily assigned valued the KMS or not. Informants felt that their utilization of the resources and contribution to KMaster was extremely high when they worked on projects in certain business units. A senior software engineer commented:
"When I first came to know about our KMS, I was working on a project in one of the VU. My project manager (from ITS-VU) I remember was extremely excited about the KMS. During that project, we interacted quite a bit with members from other business units through KMaster. We extensively used the discussion forum repositories that featured various technologies and domains, to discuss some of the pain-points in our project." Other software engineers who had worked in a three month project in ITS-VU explained that during that project, they created a series of generic software codes which were likely to be used routinely in many applications. Following the number of messages posted by the KM implementation team on the organizational intranet about how knowledge sharing can reduce project completion times, they neatly classified all the generic codes they had created and uploaded them to the organizational KMS. In essence, the project managers from the ITS-VU unit had acted as evangelists for the systems, enthusiastically promoting it to the new, temporary members from ITS-HU. However, the members of ITS-HU only appeared to engage in the KMS while they were assigned to teams within ITS-VU. Engineers assigned to work temporarily for an OSDC unit expressed quite different experiences. Three software engineers, who were part of a project in an OSDC unit for close to a year, explained that they hardly ever accessed the organization-wide KMS. One of them noted:
"In the OSDC project, organizational KM was definitely not on top of our minds. Even when we had technology domain related queries that perhaps could have been answered by an expert here in ITS, we chose to post a query in the KM portal on the client organization's intranet to which we had been given access." In short, while members in ITS-HU appeared to have an open-mind towards supporting ITS's intent to create and build a strong KMS platform, they tended to participate very frequently or infrequently in KM activities depending on what they called the "culture" of different units. In their experience, whenever they were part of a project in an OSDC unit they rarely shared knowledge via KMaster since the "culture there was different". However, whenever they worked on a project in a VU, they were more involved with the KMS. A senior software engineer at ITS-HU explained:
"The KM team expects us to contribute case studies, re-usable artifacts and so on to KMaster, and they often wonder why we don't give it to them. How interested we are in KM at any given time largely depends on the general attitude towards KM in the business unit we move in to. At present, the feeling in this unit (my present location) is that the KM initiative is concerned purely with numbers. So there is a lot of resistance to contribute." According to a senior project manager:
"Overall, I think the organizational KMS is a great idea and I see its value to us, but over the years we have simply followed what we see in our assigned units."
The case of ITS-OS
Culturally, members of ITS-OS identified with the values of their clients and lost attachment to the values of ITS. As captured in the informants' quotes below, the culture at ITS-OS coincided with what Martin and Siehl (1983) refer to as a "countercultural" subculture. A senior V-P of ITS explained:
"Let us say a team works on a project for a leading global financial firm. Now we (ITS) want to retain some of the knowledge that we have gained from the project with this financial firm. So we want the team to remain rather than keep moving from one project to another, like what happens when the first project is for a global financial firm and the next one is for (say) a global manufacturing firm. So to maintain the continuity and knowledge retention, we set up OSDCs. Now we have about 30 of them. In an OSDC setup naturally the client has a major say, and so we become tuned to the client culture, language etc., and the OSDCs become slightly removed from the rest of the organization."
Informants at ITS-OS felt that owing to the long term relationship with a single client organization, they tended to be more attached emotionally to the client organization and that in everyday organizational life they often mentally invoked the client organization, its logo, its mission statement etc., and the prestige associated with it. Since the implementation of the KMS, the 400 members in ITS-OS have very rarely contributed or accessed any of the IT applications available on the organization-wide KMS. A project manager explained:
"Yes, I am aware that the organizational KMS exists. In fact, I support it and think it is very good for our unit too. But somehow it has become just a peripheral event. It has never touched us, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that we have not allowed it to touch us. Having central knowledge repositories arranged according to various technologies and domains and keeping them updated is a very good idea, but I can say for sure that people from our OSDC have very little to do with it." Informants in ITS-OS explained that some of them still attended a number of meetings conducted by the KM team where they are asked to contribute re-usable software codes, documents featuring the best practices in ITS-OS, case studies, etc. But most informants claimed that the top-management often 'pushed' initiatives such as KMS to make sure that ITS-OS does not become too independent. Some also recollected that a few years back the top-management team asked everyone at ITS-OS to follow an organization-wide quality related best practice program, which involved extensive documentation:
"As with the KMS now, we opposed it totally then. Every now and then someone at the top comes with a bright idea to interfere!" Another reason, which informants gave for their limited experience with the KMS was the non-disclosure agreements (NDA) with the client organization. These NDA clearly restricted the sharing of sensitive knowledge privy to the off shore team with the rest of the organization.
However, the head of the KM team pointed out that apart from client-specific forms of knowledge, there was a vast body of useful technical knowledge that could be shared via KMaster, but still remained unshared. When asked to reflect on this, many informants agreed. A senior technical manager said:
"Yes, given that we have the NDA it does become easy for us to hide behind it and say that everything is protected and KMS is not for us. We do it all the time, but you must understand that the culture here is different."
According to a senior V-P at ITS-OS, the isolation of ITS-OS from the organizational mainstream and its reluctance to play a significant role in the organizational KMS was a compromise the organization had to face up to. He felt that a special environment was in place at ITS-OS where members prided themselves so much on their relationship with the client organization that to them, the KMS was far removed from their everyday life. Such a perception among members at ITS-OS, he opined, needs to be somehow accommodated so that members in ITS-OS are more forthcoming towards the KMS.
A cross-case analysis of the alignment and implementation of the KMS
Considering the above within-case analyses of the three units in tandem with the KMS implementation in the corporate unit, we now present below a cross-case analysis that also incorporates the key theory-driven factors underpinning alignment and implementation (see tables 4 and 5 for an overview of this analysis).
A cross-case analysis of KMS alignment
The first phase of ITS's KMS was geared solely toward the corporate unit and was marked by its focus on ensuring that sales and business development personnel are provided with up-to-date information when meeting potential clients. This focus of the KMS was reflective of the company's endeavors to increase its client base and grow as an IT organization. Looking at Table 4 , we see that the underlying strategic focus of the corporate unit and the KMS was wellaligned following the preconditions for strategic alignment identified in existing IS research (Chan, 2002; Henderson and Venkatraman, 1993; Luftman and Brier, 1999; Rockart et al., 1996) . Not only were formal structures in place to ensure alignment, but it was also backed by the shared commitment of the sales and business personnel, who formed the organizational counterparts of the KMS and reported to the top-management team. Thus, this alignment was both along the 'intellectual dimension' (well spelt out aims of the KMS and the presence of structures to support the aims) and 'social dimension' (shared commitment) Benbasat, 1996, 2000) . Further, in having a permanent full-time ten member KM implementation team composed of members with both IS and business skills, the KMS implementation also followed the preconditions set out for achieving "IS structural alignment" (Chan, 2002; Tavakolian, 1989 ).
However, from an alignment point of view, as the scope and aims of the KMS expanded beyond its original intent and aimed to penetrate the technical community -the software developers and project managers in the VU, HU, and OSDC units -the existing strength of the strategic alignment was no longer sufficient to maintain the success of the KMS. Instead, responses grounded in the enhancing, countercultural and chameleon subcultural affiliations of the various business units became a key to continued alignment.
As seen in Table 4 , most of the major factors influencing strategic and structural alignment were met across the 3 business units: there were representatives on the KM team who had formally worked in each of the three units, hence creating a shared domain knowledge between the KM team and business units. Moreover, business unit managers in each of the units expressed support for the KMS and believed that it would help their respective business unit.
Also, each of the business units was operating in a stable environment, experiencing growth both in clients and in services provided. In spite of these strategic and structural factors that are key to alignment being met, the responses of the three units to the KMS varied starkly. Looking into Table 4 , the only alignment factor that is not similar across the 3 units is that of favorable informal structure. Whereas the ITS-VU enjoyed an enhancing subculture that appears to have helped the unit assimilate the KMS even if it was not designed originally for them, the counterculture of the ITS-OS and the chameleon culture of ITS-HU seemed to have militated against the alignment of the system at the sub-unit level. In the case of ITS-OS, even while members stated that they could understand the benefits of knowledge-sharing to the organization, they excused themselves from participating based upon their belief that ITS-OS should not be contributing knowledge, regardless of its benefits to the larger organization, because of its unique relationships to clients, a relationship not shared, in their minds, by other parts of the organization.
Ironically, many members of ITS-HU had experienced these client relationships in their assignments on OSDC teams. Perhaps best positioned to understand the benefits of a KMS were the members of ITS-HU, who had participated on teams within ITS-VU as well as ITS-OSDC.
Yet rather than acting as boundary spanners, encouraging the use of the system in the teams to which they were assigned, the members of ITS-HU appeared to have sublimated their own opinions to those of the team to which they were assigned, resulting in an alignment pattern that was difficult to control and manage: members of ITS-HU assigned to VU teams supported the systems while those assigned to OSDC teams did not. In this sense, the system was partially aligned, with the alignment varying both across time and individuals and even to the point of varying by individual across time. The cases of ITS-HU and ITS-OS illustrate that organizational level strategic and structural alignment does not in and of itself filter down to the sub-unit level. Unless the sub-unit has an enhancing subculture, the process of alignment must reoccur at the sub-unit level.
Key factors influencing alignment
Evidence from the cases
Corporate unit KMS
ITS-VU ITS-HU ITS-OS
Support of senior executives for the IS (Luftman and Brier, 1999) √ The KMS was the CEO's idea. The senior-executives supported the system in all the units IT management sophistication (Sabherwal and Kirs, 1994) √ ITS is an IT organization, which is very experienced in managing systems. Further, all the business units at ITS managed their own IT systems and had experience with system design and implementation at the unit level.
Shared domain knowledge between IS and business executives (Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Rockart et al., 1996) √ The KM team was composed of members with experience in client facing roles. The KM team had members with previous experience of working in different units. In other words, the KM team was composed of members who shared domain specific knowledge with members in the three units.
Environmental stability (Choe, 2003; Kearns and Lederer, 2004) √ ITS is seen as operating in a relatively stable environment. The number of projects taken up by all the business units is increasing gradually and ITS has annual revenues of over US$ 1 billion. Most analysts foresee the IT services sector to grow further and the business environment is generally considered robust and stable Communication between business and IT executives (Reich and Benbasat, 2000) √ The head of the KM team reported directly to the president of ITS. Further, the KM team members and the managers in the three business units maintained excellent communication both through formal and informal channels and showed commitment to the strategic aims of the KMS. (Reich and Benbasat, 2000) √ The KMS was planned to help members in their sales and business development activities. The KMS was designed to help members work more efficiently. Also, by building on the project experiences captured through the KMS, ITS planned to offer a wider range of services to clients in the three units. This was seen to help the longterm business prospects of the three units.
Connections between business and IT planning
Favorable informal
structures (Chan, 2002) √ Table 5 , it is evident that of the units considered, the KMS implementation was best placed to succeed, and did in fact succeed, in the corporate unit given that all the key implementation factors -such as involvement of users in design, user control of implementation, perceived usefulness -were met. Moreover, the system was not originally intended to extend to other areas and was indeed tailored towards the needs of the corporate unit. In the case of ITS-VU, ITS-OS and ITS-HU, it is clear that the three subcultures and the underpinning shared cultural interpretations (Robey and Azevedo, 1994; Robey and Boudreau, 1999) played an important role in influencing the success of the KMS implementation. The enhancing subculture, which complemented and reflected the larger organizational culture, was accepting of the KMS in spite of some preconditions to implementation success being violated: the ITS-VU members were not involved in the design and the implementation was entirely controlled by the KM team (see Table 5 ).
In contrast, while barriers to implementation success at ITS-OS (see table 5 ) such as the lack of cognitive absorption of the KMS (Agarwal and Karahanna, 2000; Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) , the inability to exercise control over the KMS implementation (Kirsch, 2004) , the nonroutinization of the KMS (Tyre and Orlikowski, 1994) and the perceived challenges to the power structure (Markus, 1983; Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) were evident, the counterculture further aggravated the challenges and influenced the collective thinking about the adoption of KMS in the unit. Put differently, ITS-OS had identified so much with its client organization culturally that there was no longer a connection, informally speaking, to ITS. Building on the greater attachment to the client organization, the beliefs of the ITS-OS counterculture also influenced the attributions assigned to the top-management champions of the KMS. Members in ITS-OS viewed the KMS as an unfair attempt at interference by the top-management into the existing fair and just arrangements at their unit level. They believed that the top-management forced them into supporting the KMS implementation to stop them from becoming too independent. To this extent, they saw the KMS as having a harmful effect on their perceived high status in the organization and did not believe the top-management's assurance of faster career growth in return for participation in KMS. Also, the subculture contributed to the challenges of implementation at ITS-OS by encouraging the members to rationalize their non-involvement with the KMS as vividly depicted in the case of members hiding behind the NDA issue. And while the members of IT-OS recognized the usefulness of the system to the organization, they did not recognize its' usefulness to them personally (see Table 5 ).
The implementation difficulties of the KMS at ITS-OS also throws light on an important issue confronting ITS. Although the very formation of the OSDC units such as ITS-OS helped the company to benefit from knowledge reuse to a limited extent (e.g., having engineers familiar with a client organization permanently assigned to that OSDC unit instead of shuffling them around to other units where they would have to learn about the client's needs before becoming a productive team member), this design led to lower knowledge transfer across units in that the lessons learned within a OSDC unit tended to remain within that unit. This might indeed turn out to be an enduring rather than a transient challenge for ITS. As Ghoshal and Gratton (2002) noted, from an organizational perspective creating isolated profit centric units often helps reap business benefits. By the same logic more OSDC units are likely to be created at ITS in the future, further intensifying the countercultural challenge to implementation success.
As with ITS-OS, ITS-HU faced difficulties in ensuring the success of the system on account of various factors, such as the lack of user involvement in the design and implementation of the system, as highlighted in Table 5 . Moreover, the chameleon subculture served to further intensify these factors.: in some senses, it is troubling that ITS-HU members would endorse the system while working on an ITS-VU team but eschew the same system while working on an OSDC unit team. So strong was the norm of adaptability to the team assigned, that it seems to have suspended their own judgments about the usefulness of the system. Not only was there variance across individuals in the perception of the system's usefulness, the same individual held varied perceptions of usefulness (see Table 5 ), depending upon his/her current assignments. It is important to keep in mind that the members of ITS-HU were performing the same functions when they were reassigned to different units, so it was not that the system was relevant to the tasks associated with one unit but not the other. Individual Level Orlikowski, 1994) VUs. It was routinized at the group, but not individual, level Shared cultural interpretations (Robey and Azevedo, 1994; Robey and Boudreau, 1999) √ The system was seen as a the top-management's response to the issues members' faced at work √ The KMS was interpreted as a valid effort to better manage knowledge √/X Members did not demonstrate any strong feelings towards the KMS X The KMS was interpreted as a symbol of topmanagement's interference Involvement of users in design (Baroudi et al., 1986) √ The KMS was developed together with the clientfacing personnel X Although members were asked for their inputs about the impending system, they were not involved in its design per-se Exercise of control over IS implementation (Kirsch, 2004) √ Members largely directed the implementation in the early days of the KM team X The well-established KM team supervised and managed the implementation across the units. Hence, the business units did not control KMS implementation, even though they were used to controlling their own IS Cognitive absorption (Agarwal and Karahanna, 2000; Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) √ Members were 'in tune' with applications such as the help-desk service and the IVR system √ Members at ITS-VU were involved in the KMS applications X The degree of involvement of members with the system and its applications was considerably lower at ITS-HU and ITS-OS Perceived ease of use (Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) √The system was easy to use and the KM team made changes as requested by users √ When the KMS was developed to include applications for the technical community, they were perceived as easy to use by members in all the 3 business units Perceived usefulness (Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) √ The system was originally designed to meet the needs of the sales and business development teams.
√ Members viewed the system as very useful and used it very often √ and X: Members at ITS-HU felt the system was useful to the organization, but not to themselves or their unit when they were assigned to OSDC units √ and X: Members viewed the system as useful to the organization, but not to themselves or their unit Users' previous experience with technology (Martinko et al., √ Given that IT was an integral part of their work, KMS users were very comfortable using new IT-based technology. A sales and marketing person or a KMS user in the three business units normally had at least some experience of using technology applications similar to those offered by the system 1996) 
Discussion: A Subculture Model of the Intersection of Alignment and Implementation
The above analysis (depicted in Figure 4 at the end of the paper) shows that alignment is best understood in concert with implementation. In other words, it underscores the complementary nature of the alignment and implementation literatures and suggests that they should be used together to explain the success of a system. Drawing upon the above analysis, we next build a subculture model depicting the intersection of alignment and implementation. For subcultures best described as Enhancing (Martin and Siehl, 1983 ), alignment at the organization level effectively ensures alignment at the sub-unit level as well as fit with individuals' values in the organization. This is depicted pictorially in Figure 1 below. While factors such as support of senior executives for IS (Luftman and Brier, 1999) and IT management sophistication (Sabherwal and Kirs, 1994) are clearly important for alignment, and factors such as individuals' perceptions of the system (Lapointe and Rivard, 2007) do influence the implementation, additionally, an enhancing subculture works in tandem with these factors and creates a positive impact. In a sub-unit with a enhancing subculture, implementation and alignment processes coexist such that successful alignment at the organization level has a trickle down effect and likewise, successful implementation trickles down to the sub-unit and individual levels.
Moreover, alignment and implementation are inter-related such that alignment facilitates implementation, and implementation success help reinforce alignment.
We argue that additional implementations of a system in different sub-units represent a continued case of alignment rather than a new case of alignment. In other words, IT managers should not need to strategically re-align a system that has spread from one sub-unit to another, assuming an enhancing subculture. In such a context, a traditional top-down approach to alignment and implementation is warranted. However, given the complexity of large organizations, one might expect instances of the Enhanced Alignment to be infrequent.
Alignment Implementation Success
Organization Level
Unit Level
Individual Level
Organization Level
Unit Level
Individual Level
Figure 1: Enhanced Alignment While a top-down approach to alignment appears to be appropriate in the context of the enhancing subculture, in the context of the chameleon subculture, such an approach would be only partially effective. There is some overlap in culture and hence, effective alignment at the organization level might well contribute to alignment at the sub-unit level, but only to the extent that at the time of implementation, members of the chameleon unit are engaged in work that is tied to overall organizational objectives as opposed to work that is tied more closely to sub-unit objectives. Even while the intersection is not complete, effective alignment at the sub-unit level is unlikely to be possible without alignment at the organization level. Figure 2 below depicts the alignment-implementation intersection for the chameleon subculture. In this case, even when the IT and business planning processes are logically connected, domain knowledge is shared between IT and business executives and communication between IT and business executives is excellent (Reich and Benbasat, 2000) , the chameleon subculture may often work against the objectives of the IS and pose difficulties for alignment and implementation success.
We also note that the most appropriate approach to alignment in the chameleon subculture would appear to be a top-bottom-up approach. Such an approach would mean that the organizational alignment factors and implementation factors would be important to help legitimate the system, but then the IS implementation team would need to try to "sell" the system to individuals, particularly influential individuals, in each sub-unit in order to gain individual commitment to the system regardless of the workgroup to which the individuals were currently assigned. Only then can the system enjoy successful implementation across groups within the sub-unit. The IS organization would need to understand the professional values held by individuals in different sub-units and ensure that the system in some way contributed to improvements in an individual's ability to perform their work (Schultze and Orlikowski, 2004) . Figure 3 below and occurs in sub-units exhibiting countercultures (Martin and Siehl, 1983) . In this context, alignment at the organizational level not only does not ensure alignment at the sub-unit level but may actually militate against successful alignment and implementation. Because organizational level initiatives are treated skeptically by members of the countercultural unit, well executed initiatives at the organization level are likely to meet with nonchalance at best. In other words, the counterculture may influence the thinking in the unit about adopting the IS and therefore pose an important barrier to alignment and successful implementation.
In this context of a counterculture, we suggest that the most appropriate approach to alignment would resemble a bottom-up approach to implementation (Ciborra, 1992) . Ciborra suggests that the structured guidelines to planning IT to support the business (e.g., aligning IT) as well as the implementation plans do not reflect the reality of most successful system design and implementation. He suggests instead that firms must allow innovation and tinkering at "the local level" such that individuals are largely responsible for the resulting system which can then move upwards in the organization (Ciborra, 1992) . In ITS's case, one way of promoting innovation at the 'ITS-OS level' could be to draw on Web 2.0 thinking and to extend the organizational KMS framework to ITS-OS. A separate KMS could be developed for ITS-OS, whose responsibility could be taken up exclusively by ITS-OS members. In summary, in the bottom-up approach each implementation of a system in a new sub-unit must be treated as a new case of alignment and implementation. Lessons learned from a previous sub-unit may be helpful, but should not alone define, or constrain, the implementation plan. Members, and not just senior managers within the sub-unit, must be made owners of the system, such that it is considered their initiative. 
Theoretical Implications
Whereas the dynamic theory of alignment suggests that a given system goes through periods of alignment and misalignment , treating a system holistically as does the traditional view of alignment (Luftman and Brier, 1999; Rockart et al., 1996) , our findings suggest that a single system spread across units in an organization might simultaneously experience alignment and misalignment. As such, alignment processes cannot be managed solely at the organizational level. Alignment research has a long and rich history. While the factors that help create alignment at the organizational level have been well described (Reich and Benbasat, 2000; Rockart et al., 1996 , Choe, 2003 Kearns and Lederer, 2004; Chan, 2002; Sabherwal and Kirs, 1994; Luftman and Brier, 1999) , our study suggests that a multi-level analysis of IS alignment is needed. Alignment of an IS in an organization cannot be understood solely by looking at the organizational level factors. The presence of these factors is not sufficient to guarantee alignment at the sub-unit level. Theoretically, this suggests that alignment models must be modified to include sub-unit level considerations. Following the empirical insights from our study, one important dimension that can be added to existing alignment models is the subcultural dimension. Alignment models, which have mostly considered strategic, structural and informal alignments in IS research may be able to provide further insights into the alignment process by incorporating 'subcultural alignment' as an important type of alignment. Future research is needed to explore the nature and stability of such subcultural alignments within the different subcultures and also to examine the longer-term implications of differences in alignment for the same system across units.
A second theoretical implication of our study concerns the intersection of alignment and implementation. Our case illustrates that organizations confront challenges of alignment and implementation simultaneously rather than sequentially as is often assumed in guidelines for alignment and implementation. Implementation research largely assumes that systems must be aligned strategically prior to implementation in order for implementation to be successful.
Likewise, alignment research assumes that successful implementation helps ensure that a system is aligned and able to deliver on its intended goals (Reich and Benbasat, 2000) . Our case helps illustrate the intertwined nature of alignment and implementation in organization-wide systems.
IS research, drawing on different 'modes of control' in organizations offers further illustration of the integration of the alignment and implementation in organization-wide IS (e.g., Henderson and Lee, 1992; Kirsch, 1996 Kirsch, , 1997 Kirsch, , 2004 . Based on studies of control in organizations (e.g., Jaworski, 1988; Ouchi, 1978) , this research stream has highlighted the formal and informal control mechanisms deployed in organizations to align the goals of different stakeholders during IS development projects. For instance, based on four case studies of IS development projects, Kirsch (1997) showed that in aligning the interests of multiple stakeholders during the implementation process, organizations put in place formal control mechanisms such as project-related rules and procedures, which controlled employee behavior and helped produce desired outcomes. Additionally, informal control mechanisms, such as common cultural beliefs among user groups and self-managed individuals also assisted the implementation process. More recently, Kirsch (2004) also demonstrated how IS and business stakeholders, in order to align their goals and interests with an organization-wide IS adopted a combination of formal and informal control mechanisms. The intersection of alignment and implementation highlighted in our study also suggests that research into the dynamic perspective of alignment may need to factor in implementation challenges at the sub-unit level to better understand the factors underpinning transitory phases of high and low alignment. Research on IS implementation on the other hand may be able to explain implementation success better by examining patterns of sub-unit alignment in organizations.
Our third theoretical implication concerns research in culture and IS. In their review of culture and IS research, Leidner and Kayworth (2006) found only scant attention to subculture.
In fact, only five of the studies empirically addressed the issue of subculture and its importance to IS (Dubé & Robey, 1999; El Sawy, 1985; Huang et al., 2003; Robbins, 2000; Von Meier, 1999) . Of these, some examine the influence of occupational subcultures on technology innovation and diffusion (Von Meier, 1999; Robbins, 2000) or on intra-organizational collaboration and information sharing (Huang et al., 2003) . Others use a broader categorization of subculture -such as Martin's (1992) integration, differentiation and fragmentation perspective -to better understand software development management practices (Dubé and Robey, 1999) or Martin and Siehl's (1983) enhancing, orthogonal, and countercultural subculture types to better understand IT implementation (El Sawy, 1985) . Our study contributes to the work on culture and IS by considering the alignment problem through a subculture lens. While larger cultural issues at the national and organizational level might well exert influence on alignment, our study chose to look at different subcultures within the same national and organizational cultural context. In so doing, we were able to gain a better understanding into the role of subculture. Future research should examine the relationships between organizational level culture and alignment as well as consider the possibility that IS alignment processes might vary across national cultures.
Concluding Remarks
Although our study is based upon a single case, we wish to draw attention to its adoption of the principles of 'analytical generalizability' (Yin, 2003) or what Lee and Baskerville (2003) refer to as the process of 'generalizing from empirical statements to theoretical statements'.
Nonetheless, our study is not without its limitations. Firstly, we focused entirely on internal opinions and did not seek the opinions of clients of ITS, which might provide a different perspective of ITS' culture. Secondly, a part of the explanation for the different responses to the KMS, particularly for the overwhelming acceptance in ITS-VU, could also lie in the conforming values and norms of the national culture of India (Hofstede, 1961) . However given our focus on subcultures, we did not consider the broader dimensions of national cultures in our study. But we do note that the national culture is consistent across sub-units and yet the subcultures exhibited marked variety. Lastly, a part of our data collection (particularly the data corresponding to the corporate unit) was retrospective and this may have influenced our analysis.
In conclusion, subcultures bring into sharp focus the socially constructed dimensions of alignment influencing both the perception of and response to the implementation of an organization-wide system. In our study, we employed Martin and Siehl's (1983) conceptualization of three subcultures because it is effective in comparing a sub-unit's culture to that of the broader organization. Our findings suggest that a fourth subculture might be in order, that culture of internally itinerant knowledge workers who neither identify strongly with the organization nor with their structural unit, but adapt the norms and values of the sub-unit to which they are temporarily assigned. We labeled this a chameleon culture.
In arguing for adopting a process-based practice lens to IS research, Orlikowski (1996, p .63) drew attention to how "a practice lens can avoid the strong assumptions of rationality, determinism, or discontinuity characterizing existing change perspectives". While the IS alignment research when taking a dynamic perspective of alignment and highlighting informal structures has certainly managed to avoid "such strong assumptions", it has been found wanting in handling and articulating at a theoretical level the informal and often less than rational factors emerging from studies. In this context, our study has empirically shown that where less rational but highly influential informal elements play a role, the theoretical framing of subcultures provides a useful analytical tool to explain strategic alignment and implementation success of an IS. "Everyone knows what is happening around here" "We are a very transparent setup" Theme 3: Determination to implement IT-based quality processes
Figure 4: A summary of the KMS implementation and issues of alignment
71%
"It is absolutely vital that business units talk to each other if we have to move up the value chain" "This is our mantra: No unit should live in a bubble" Theme 4: Information and communication openness
83.33%
"We constantly scan the environment for best practices and strive to implement them internally". "Given what we do and given our steadfast belief in the power of IT, we will always push through IT initiatives that help us do better things" project, but I simply cannot harp on it now" Theme 4: Offer support to the dominant thinking in the current business unit "Many of the business units we work in have their own norms and practices and for the time we are there, we religiously follow all of them." "In my current business unit, everybody is dead serious about quality processes and now I find myself totally in agreement with them." NOTES: * The terms 'Themes' and 'Cultural/Subcultural category' used here can be thought of as similar to Van Maanen's (1983) 'First-order concepts' and 'Second-order concepts'. ** We did not create an abstracted theme for the overall organizational culture, given our focus on subcultures.
